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JOHN R. HARRISON* and PHILLIP J. KOLCZYNSKI**
INTRODUCTIONO NE OF the more unique forms of regulation of aviation
in the United States involves the certification of aircraft and
aircraft appliances by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
and its delegates in the aviation industry. As the government has
come to be involved in air crash litigation with increasing regular-
ity, a number of cases have raised the question whether the gov-
ernment should be liable in damages for negligence in its perfor-
mance of this certification function. It is the purpose of this article
to address that question, which remains very much unsettled at
the present time. (The related question of potential government
liability for negligence in certifying pilots and other personnel is
not considered here.)
The authors submit that a close examination of the regulatory
process involved in certification will reveal that it is a form of
regulating adjudication which Congress delegated to agency dis-
cretion. We also suggest that the certification process, which is
a "passive" one unlike the "active" provision of services such as
air traffic control, does not give rise to any governmental duty to
individual members of the general public. Further, it would appear
that even if a cause of action for "negligent certification" might
exist, it would properly be held to fall within the "discretionary
function" or "misrepresentation" exceptions to the general tort
* John R. Harrison, LL.B., U. of Detroit, 1955, an Assistant Chief Counsel,
Office of the Chief Counsel, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.,
is the Chief of the Litigation Division.
** Phillip J. Kolczynski, B.A., Marquette U., 1969, J.D., Case Western Reserve
U., 1977, is a Trial Attorney, Litigation Division, Office of the Chief Counsel,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C.
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liability of he federal government. Thus, the government should
not be held liable for negligence in certifying aircraft.
THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act)' provides for
the development of a comprehensive regulatory system to promote
aviation safety. This legislation authorizes the FAA to regulate the
aviation industry by establishing minimum safety standards.! The
Act also gives the Administrator of the FAA' extensive discretion
to promulgate regulations and issue orders or perform acts as "he
shall deem necessary" to exercise and perform his powers and du-
ties under the Act." As part of his general safety power the Ad-
ministrator prescribes minimum standards governing the design,
materials, workmanship, construction and performance of aircraft,
aircraft engines and propellers as may be required in the interest
of safety.'
In order to market its product, an aviation manufacturer must
satisfy certification or licensing requirements prescribed by the
Act.' The certification process requires that the manufacturer-
applicant initially submit such design and performance data as the
Administrator deems necessary to determine that the design of an
aircraft meets the minimum standards promulgated by the FAA.'
Upon evaluation of the manufacturer's data, the Administrator, or
the person to whom he has delegated his certificating authority,
makes a final determination, based on both objective and subjective
criteria, that an applicant for an aircraft certificate has sufficiently
complied with regulatory minimum safety standards to receive a
license.
FAA aircraft certification is a three-tiered process. First a Type
172 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970 & Supp. V 1975),
formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
249 U.S.C. § 1421(a) (1970).
3 49 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970). The Administrator shall hereinafter be substituted
in lieu of "Secretary" where authority has been delegated to the FAA pursuant
to the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. §5 1651 et seq. (1970).
449 U.S.C. 5 1354(a) (1970).
249 U.S.C. S 1421(a)(1) (1970).
'49 U.S.C. § 1423(a)-(c) (1970).
'49 U.S.C. S 1423(a)(2) (1970).
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Certificate must be obtained." In turn, the manufacturer may ob-
tain a Production Certificate based on the manufacturer's ability
to attain conformity of production models with the "type," i.e.,
the prototype, and begin the manufacture of production models.'
Both Type and Production Certificates apply to the finished air-
craft as well as certain appliances to be used in the aircraft."0 As
a condition of the issuance of the Production Certificate, quality
control procedures are included in the phases of production before
final assembly of the aircraft.'
Upon final assembly and distribution of the aircraft, the last
stage of the certification process involves the issuance of the Air-
worthiness Certificate." It is unlawful to operate an aircraft in air
commerce without a current Airworthiness Certificate or in viola-
tion of its provisions." An Airworthiness Certificate is issued when
the Administrator finds that the aircraft conforms to its Type
Certificate and is in condition for safe operation." Should a person
desire to make a major change in the aircraft's design by modifi-
cation, so that it no longer conforms to the type design approved
in the Type Certificate, he must obtain a Supplemental Type Cer-
tificate." The manufacturer who holds the original Type Certifi-
cate and incorporates a major change merely applies for an
"amendment" of his original license."
The Act permits the Administrator to delegate the examination,
inspection and testing necessary to the issuance of certificates,
and the actual issuance of such certificates, to any properly quali-
fied private person or such person's employee." Under a Delegated
Option Authority (DOA) the manufacturers of small airplanes
can obtain authority to test, inspect, and certificate their own
products independent of direct FAA supervision." Another form
849 U.S.C. § 1423(a) (1970); 14 C.F.R. Part 21, subpart B (1977).
'49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1970); 14 C.F.R. Part 21, subpart G (1977).
1014 C.F.R. S 21.11 (1977).
11 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.139, 21.143 (1977).
12 14 C.F.R. Part 21, subpart H (1977).
1349 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(1) (1970).
1449 U.S.C. 5 1423(c) (1970).
- 14 C.F.R. § 21.111-21.119 (1977).
1' 14 C.F.R. S 21.113 (1977).
1749 U.S.C. § 1355(a) (1970).
1814 C.F.R. 55 21.231-21.293 (1977).
1978]
26 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [44
of delegation, especially useful in the type certification of larger,
more complex aircraft, is the appointment of Designated Engineer-
ing Representatives (DER).' These specialists approve the manu-
facturer's engineering test data under guidelines prescribed by the
Administrator. Manufacturers may also nominate an employee as a
Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representative (DMIR) .
These delegates of the Administrator are permitted to issue Air-
worthiness Certificates when they inspect an aircraft and find that
it conforms to its Type Certificate and is in a condition for safe
operation.
Once an aircraft and its engine are certificated as airworthy,
the holders of Type and Production Certificates, as well as aviation
manufacturers, are under a continuing duty to report to the FAA
any failure, malfunction or defect resulting in certain enumerated
serious problems, which were not attributable to improper main-
tenance or usage.' The Act also establishes a procedure for "any
person" to file a complaint with the FAA claiming violations of
the statute or regulations.' If there is reasonable ground for the
complaint, the FAA has a statutorily-imposed duty to investigate
such matters. Regardless of the source of the information, if the
Administrator is made aware that an unsafe condition exists in
a product, or is likely to exist or develop in other products of the
same type design, he may compel corrections, impose flight limi-
tations, or prohibit the operation of an aircraft by means of an
Airworthiness Directive." If at anytime the Administrator should
determine by reinspection that safety and the public interest re-
quire amendment, suspension or revocation of any aircraft cer-
tificate, he may issue an order taking such action after first accord-
ing the holder of a certificate an opportunity to be heard."
REGULATORY ADJUDICATION
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)" reveals a congres-
sional intent to allow agencies to perform a judicial function
19 14 C.F.R. S 183.29 (1977).
- 14 C.F.R. S 183.31 (1977).
21 14 C.F.R. S 21.3 (1977).
2249 U.S.C. 5 1482(a); 14 C.F.R. S 13.1 (1977).
" Morton v. Dow, 525 F.2d 1302 (10th Cir. 1975).
- 49 U.S.C. S 1429 (1970).
"60 Stat. 237, as amended, 5 U.S.C. §5 551 et seq. (1970).
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known as "regulatory adjudication" when exercising discretion
in the granting of a license, or certificate, to an applicant."0 Since
according to the APA a certificate is a license, an "Order" issuing
or denying an aircraft certificate is a final disposition by the Ad-
ministrator and is subject to review only by the courts of appeal
of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia." Thus, when the FAA issues an "Order"
granting an aircraft certificate, an order which is final and review-
able only by the circuit courts, the Administrator has performed
an adjudicatory function. When the Administrator decides to grant
or deny certification, he must assess the effects of his decision
on the general public as well as on the applicant. This assessment
involves an analysis of various safety, economic, environmental,
and transportation policy factors which regulatory agencies are
particularly well equipped to make.
It is the expressed intent of Congress that the Administrator
establish minimum standards and processes to encourage safety.
The Administrator has given certain officials the discretionary
power to implement the certification process in a manner calcu-
lated to promote safety. Judicial review of regulatory adjudication
should be confined to a determination of whether the Administrator
has acted outside the scope of discretion delegated by Congress."
Readjudication of the act of certification would undermine the
administrative expertise, uniformity, and finality brought to bear
by orders of the Administrator of the FAA, and result in court-
created standards for certification rather than the minimum stand-
ards Congress intended by the Act.
Several district courts have rendered opinions in air crash cases
which imply that a cause of action exists against the government
for erroneous certification. We suggest that closer examination
" See H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1195 (1946). Regulatory
adjudication is a final disposition by an "order" resulting from a process which
is "adjudicative." I.T.T. v. Local 134, 419 U.S. 428, 443 (1974). The APA de-
fines "adjudication" as the "agency process for the formulation of an order." 5
U.S.C. § 551(7) (1970). An "order" is defined as a final disposition, whether
affirmative or negative, of an agency in a matter other than rule-making but in-
cluding licensing. 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1970).
2 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1970); Cf. Board of Supervisors of Fairfax City,
Va. v. McLucas, 410 F. Supp. 1052 (D.D.C. 1967).
2 Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 910 (1976).
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of these cases will show that the certification of aircraft by the
FAA does not give rise to a duty of due care flowing to individual
members of the public. Furthermore, an examination of the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA)" will reveal that when an FAA
official certificates an airplane, such an adjudication is the per-
formance of a "discretionary function," or, even if erroneously
made, it is an unintentional "misrepresentation" for which the
sovereign immunity of the United States has not been waived.
No ACTIONABLE DUTY ARISES As A RESULT OF THE
CERTIFICATION OF AIRCRAFT BY THE FAA
A cause of action against the United States for a negligent act
or omission must arise within the purview of the FTCA." The
FTCA is a limited waiver of the sovereign immunity of the United
States for the "negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."'"
A potential plaintiff must establish initially that the United States,
".. . if [treated as] a private person," would owe a duty of due
care to the injured individual.
It has been held that the government cannot assert its sovereign
capacity as a defense to distinguish the duties it owes to individuals
from those duties owed by private persons to others.3" However, this
does not mean that all regulations promulgated by the sovereign
are intended to create a duty to the individual. Many governmental
regulations and directives merely establish reciprocal responsi-
bilities between the sovereign and its official staff."'
Certain directives, which order that services (such as air traffic
control) be provided to the public, have been held to create, in
the provision of such services, a duty of care to members of the
2)28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (1970).
8128 U.S.C. 5 2679(a)-(b) (1970).
3128 U.S.C. SS 2672, 2674 (1970).
12See, e.g., Eastern Airlines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir.
1955), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
'See Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140, 1144 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 98 S.Ct. 1876 (1978).
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public." Having assumed the responsibility for providing these
services, the government must perform them with due care.' These
directives, however, must be distinguished from those which require
that certain employees or delegates of an agency carry out regula-
tory responsibilities imposed by the agency's enabling statute.
Although regulations or directives establish safety standards or
provide for inspections to ensure compliance with such standards,
the benefits of these governmental acts flow to the body politic
and not to any individual or group of individuals so as to render
the United States liable for negligence in their performance."
The Act is such a regulatory statute. It was designed to secure
the safety and welfare of the flying public as an entity and not
to establish a legal duty of care to any particular individual."' The
general rule is that a statute which does not purport to establish
civil liability, but merely makes provisions to secure the safety
or welfare of the public as an entity, is not subject to a construc-
tion establishing civil liability."'
Courts have implied a private cause of action from a statute
which includes a general grant of jurisdiction to the district courts
to enforce the provisions of the statute.' Courts are particularly
prone to such construction where it is clear that the congressional
intent of the regulatory statute would be furthered by implying
such a right.' The Act is devoid of such general jurisdictional
provisions, and there is no evidence that Congress intended the
4 See, e.g., Dickens v. United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977); Ingham
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
931 (1967).
s5 Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955).
'Kropp v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 329 F. Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Ger-
neth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1109 (1973).
"
TSee Clemente v. U.S., 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977); Sanz v. Renton Avi-
ation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Moungey v.
Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 450-53 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Porter v. Southeastern Avi-
ation, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 42, 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961), Moodey v. McDaniel, 190
F. Supp. 24, 28 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
38 73 AM. JUR. 2d Statutes § 432 (1974).
8' J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
4 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), where the Supreme Court provides a
checklist to help the lower courts determine if a statute creates a private remedy.
See also Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes, 77
HARv. L. REV. 285 (1963).
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creation of a private cause of action."1 On the contrary, the Act
expressly left intact the rights and remedies of an individual in
the common law."
There is substantial authority for the proposition that regula-
tory statutes do not expose the government to civil liability by
their provisions. ' For example, Kirk v. U.S." emphasized that a
regulatory statute, which imposed a duty on the Secretary of Army
to establish and supervise a program of river improvement and
flood control, did not expose the government to civil liability for
the death of a dam project construction worker, absent the express
or implied approval of Congress. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the holding of the district court, stating that the statute
at bar created no legal duty on the part of the United States to-
wards the unfortunate construction worker. The appellate court
also held that regulations authorized by the statute did not create
a legal duty to individuals, reasoning that,
Every government employee must trace the duties of his job to
some law, regulation or order,but this does not mean that in every
such case there is thereby established a duty of care on the part
of the employee and the government toward those who may be
incidentally benefitted if those are properly performed or toward
those who may be incidentally injured if those duties are not
properly performed. '
Most courts which have construed the provisions of the Act
and the regulations promulgated thereunder have held that the
Act does not create a private cause of action for individuals."
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the Act in Sanz v. Renton Aviation
41See S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1958).
4249 U.S.C. 5 1506 (1970).
41 See, e.g., Gerneth v. City of Detroit, 465 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1109 (1973); Kirk v. United States, 270 F.2d 110 (9th Cir.
1959); Davis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 793 (D. Neb. 1975), afl'd, 536 F.2d
758 (8th Cir. 1976).
44 161 F. Supp. 722 (D. Idaho 1959), afl'd, 270 F.2d 110 (9th Cir. 1959).
4270 F.2d at 118.
"E.g., Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975); Dickens
v. United States, 378 F. Supp. 845, 854 (S.D. Tex. 1974), afl'd, 545 F.2d 886
(5th Cir. 1977); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 684 (D.
Col. 1969); contra, Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 615 (C.D.
Cal. 1972); see also Note, The Applicability of Federal Common Law to Avia-
tion Tort Litigation, 63 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1094-97 (1975).
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Inc.' and held that Congress did not intend to create a federal
cause of action against aircraft operators in favor of all members
of the public who suffer injury, from whatever cause, through the
use of rented aircraft. The court reasoned that the public policy
underlying the Act which might support the implication of a pri-
vate cause of action is that pertaining to "the promotion of safety
in air commerce. '"'8 However, the court noted that safety would
not be enhanced by holding the operator of an airplane liable when
he was not at fault for the crash. Similarly, in an alleged negligent
certification case, aviation safety will not be advanced by the re-
adjudication of the certification processes.
Notwithstanding the absence of congressional intent to create
an actionable duty through the Act, several district courts have
sought to justify the existence of a cause of action against the
United States based on the certification of aircraft. In Gibbs v.
United States," the court postulated, using the logic of Indian
Towing v. United States," "that having decided to enter the broad
field of regulation of the flight and repair modification of aircraft,
the government becomes responsible for the care with which
those activities are conducted."'" This case, however, is not au-
thority for the proposition that a cause of action exists for negligent
certification, since the above-mentioned comments were mere dicta.
The court held that there was no negligence on the part of the
FAA which proximately caused the crash."
A careful analysis of the complicated facts in Gibbs reveals
that, at the time of the crash, the aircraft did not have a valid
Type Certificate or Supplemental Type Certificate in effect. The
court found that something had gone wrong, and that there was
a lack of coordination between those involved in the certification
process. 3 The court failed to distinguish between the responsibilities
of the mechanics, an Authorized Inspector, and the one FAA
47511 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 1975).
I4 d. at 1029.
49 251 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
" 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (The Coast Guard, having assumed a duty to provide
navigational guidance by means of lighthouses, is liable to the same extent as a
private individual if it negligently allows the lights to go out).
' 251 F. Supp. at 400.
51 Id. at 401.
63 Id. at 400.
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employee involved, so as to accurately assign negligence for the
error in a manner which would point to negligent certification
by the government.
The reasoning used in Gibbs, which would impose liability for
regulation by certification, has- been rejected in Clemente v. U.S."
In this recent decision, the First Circuit distinguished between a
situation where the government has assumed a responsibility to
provide services to individual members of the public via air traffic
control, and those governmental functions such as certification
wherein a particular agency is merely carrying out its regulatory
responsibilities from which the individual members of the public
derive incidental benefits.
In a case brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act,' Rapp v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,"6 the court implied that the FAA had a
duty under the Act towards third persons, relying on the statutory
language that the Administrator "shall. . . perform his.., duties in
such a manner as will best tend to reduce or eliminate the pos-
sibility of, or recurrence of, accidents in air transportation."'
The Rapp court reasoned that the government was negligent for
issuing a Type Certificate when it knew that the aircraft's engines
were capable of ingesting birds, and further in failing to provide
for additional tests to determine the outcome if a Lockheed Electra
should ingest a flock of birds." Rapp is of no precedential value,
since it was remanded and vacated by the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals, and settled prior to trial on remand.
The reasoning in Rapp reflects a recurring problem. Perhaps
there is an element of sympathy, or a sociological reason, whereby
litigants have been able to convince courts that the FAA could
have done something more to prevent a crash, and that the
agency's decision to certificate an aircraft without requiring this
additional something (presently painfully obvious through the
benefit of hindsight) amounts to negligent certification. This rea-
soning presumes the existence of the duty and foreseeability ele-
"4See note 35, supra.
"46 U.S.C. §§ 741 et. seq. (1970).
"1 264 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Pa. 1967), rev'd and vacated, 521 F.2d 1399 (3d
Cir. 1970).
5T49 U.S.C. § 1421(b) (1970).
11264 F. Supp. at 680-81.
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ments and, at the same time, ignores the extensive discretion in-
volved when the Administrator determines the nature and extent of
testing. To say that the FAA should have denied certification be-
cause an engine might lose power in the highly unlikely event that
an airplane encounters a flock of over 100 starlings (as it did in
Rapp) is tantamount to requiring the Administrator to certifiy
only engines which can withstand anything that might go down the
intake.
In Arney v. United States," another admiralty case, the allega-
tion of negligent certification of a modified fuel system raised the
issue of duty. The district court granted summary judgment to
the United States.' The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the summary judgment on the ground that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the fuel system was negligently
certificated, defective as originally constructed, or negligently modi-
fied." On remand the case was resolved by a nominal settlement,
precluding any disposition on the question of duty. It is note-
worthy that the Ninth Circuit erroneously cited the district court
opinion in Rapp6 for the proposition that there could be a cause
of action against the United States for negligent certification, ap-
parently unaware that the Third Circuit had reversed and vacated
the judgment against the United States handed down by the dis-
trict court in that case.'
In Ciccarelli v. United States," a wrongful death action re-
sulting from an air crash, the question of duty was raised through
the government's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' allegation that
the Act was designed to protect a certain class of persons, thereby
imposing on the FAA a duty to the members of that class. The
plaintiffs alleged negligence in the issuance of Type, Production,
and Airworthiness Certificates. Viewing the pleadings in a light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the court denied the government's
motion, and concluded that the Act did impose a duty of due
care in certification toward those classes of people such as air-
59 479 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1973).
60 Id. at 655.
61 Id. at 660.
61 Id. at 658.
"521 F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970).
Civ. No. S-1940, (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1972).
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craft pilots, owners, and passengers. Ciccarelli is of questionable
precedential value since the action against the United States was
abandoned before trial on the merits.
Rapp and Ciccarelli are the only cases which lend some support
to the theory that a cause of action for negligent certification
might exist against the United States. Neither is an authoritative
interpretation of the Act, nor should they be considered disposi-
tive of the question of duty. The FAA cannot guarantee safety
for the flying public by means of the certification process and
should not be placed in the position of an insurer against injuries
from negligently manufactured airplanes. Since the common law
places the ultimate liability (and often strict liability) on the
manufacturer for harm caused by a defective product, the courts
should not imply a cause of action against the United States from
a regulatory statute enacted by Congress to safeguard the public
as a whole.
THE CERTIFICATION PROCESS Is A DISCRETIONARY
FUNCTION FOR WHICH THERE CAN BE No LIABILITY
UNDER THE FTCA
The taxpayers cannot afford to insure against liability each and
every political decision and regulatory act performed by the func-
tionaries of their government. To expose all decisions of govern-
ment officials to review by damage suits would inhibit their
initiative by making them fearful that each of their decisions
would have to suffer judicial scrutiny. Therefore, when Congress
partially abrogated the sovereign immunity of the United States
by enacting the FTCA, it created a "discretionary function excep-
tion,"' to protect the regulatory acts of government from judicial
review in the guise of a tort suit.
Although a substantial body of common law has developed
concerning the performance of "discretionary" acts by government
functionaries, Congress failed to define which functions it con
sidered "discretionary." The Dalehite case"5 determined that the
"exception" should be broadly construed, and that "where there
is room for policy judgment and decision there is discretion."'"
'28 U.S.C. 5 2860(a) (1970).
"Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
"Id. at 36.
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The Supreme Court, in refusing to define where discretion ends,
indicated that not only were the planning level policy decisions
of administrators protected by the exception, but that the acts of
employees who carry out those discretionary plans were also
exempt from suit. 8 The Court has not further defined the meaning
of "discretionary function" since Dalehite."
Various measures of discretion have been devised by the lower
courts to determine whether to apply the discretionary function
exception:
1) Does the person whose judgment is attacked function at
the discretionary planning level or does he merely execute policy
at an operational level?"'
2) Is the act involved of a nature and quality which Congress
intended to put beyond review?"1
3) Did the decision-maker look to considerations of govern-
ment policy?"'
4) Were clear standards set forth for measuring individual
facts so that the discretionary balance of several factors is not
necessary?"
Many courts have applied these tests with diverse results, yet few
cases have dealt with the viability of the discretionary function
defense in cases of alleged erroneous certification. Those courts
which have dealt with this issue have not thoroughly analyzed the
certification process to determine whether there is room for "policy
judgment." The typical certification determination amounts to a
regulatory adjudication. An FAA official makes both an objective
and subjective appraisal of test results submitted to him by the
manufacturer, and in his judgment determines whether there has
been adequate compliance with federal regulations to merit the
issuance of a certificate.
", Id. at 33.
Go See, e.g., Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955) (interpreta-
tion of S 2674 of the Act and not the discretionary function exception); Rayo-
nier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319 (1957) (government liability is to
be measured by that of private individual and expressly rejected the "uniquely
government capacity" argument).
70 United States v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 76 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
71 Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975).
7 1 1Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
" Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
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In Cicarelli," the district court in dictum addressed the applic-
ability of the discretionary function exception, and merely specu-
lated that certification might be considered an operational func-
tion.'2 Another district court, in Hoffman v. U.S.," denied the
motion for summary judgment of the United States by narrowly
construing the discretionary function exception as inapplicable to
the functions performed by an official under a regulation which
is specific as to the minimum requirements for a certificate." The
court applied the test developed in Hendry v. United States,"
which requires a matching of clear standards against given facts.
It reasoned that the FAA's issuance of an Air Taxi/Commer-
cial Operator (ATCO) Certificate without requiring strict com-
pliance with one of the regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board
(CAB)T (concerning a requirement that the carrier obtain lia-
bility insurance), was a non-discretionary act outside the scope
of the discretionary function exception to the FTCA. ° The focus
switched from this issue at trial, when the court held that the
failure of the FAA to enforce its own regulation requiring evidence
of compliance with the CAB economic regulation" before issuing
an ATCO Certificate in no way proximately caused the crash
which prompted plaintiff's lawsuit." As a result, the trial court
found that "no cause of action existed against the United States."8
Since an appeal and cross-appeal to the Sixth Circuit have
been taken in Hoffman," the reasoning of the district court merits
some attention. The Hoffman court believed a clear-cut standard
for FAA conduct was involved, thereby leaving little room for
discretion.' A more careful judicial analysis of the regulatory
process in question would have revealed that it was the "applicant"
'Note 64 supra.
75 Id.
11 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
" Id. at 539.
78418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969).
7- 14 C.F.R. § 298.42 (1977).
8 398 F. Supp. at 539.
81 14 C.F.R. 5 135.15 (1977).
82 Hoffman v. United States, 14 Av. Cases, 17,646 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
83 Id.
" Hoffman v. United States, Nos. 77-1290, 1291 (6th Cir. May 19, 1977).
85 Notes 76-81, supra, and accompanying text.
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who had to satisfy clearly ascertainable standards promulgated in
a CAB regulation, after which an applicant would be eligible for
an ATCO Certificate. The FAA had formulated a national policy
of selectively not enforcing one of its own regulations!' in this
regard, and permitted ATCO Certification despite the failure of
an applicant to meet CAB insurance requirements. Under this
policy any known violation of the CAB rule would be forwarded
to the CAB for enforcement. In dictum, the court implied that
this might be a case of negligent certification."' However, the
court failed to note that the regulation, which only imposed certain
requirements on applicants, did not by its terms place any re-
strictions on the FAA's freedom to grant or deny certificates as
it sees fit, even to technically ineligible applicants.
As to the government's discretionary function defense, the court
in Hoffman called for an analysis of "whether the decision maker
necessarily looked to considerations of public policy,"8 and de-
scribed this question as a factor in determining the applicability
of the discretionary function exception. Yet, ironically, the court
failed to take this factor into account when it glossed over the fact
that a senior FAA official had formulated a national policy in-
structing FAA field personnel not to withhold ATCO certification
merely because an applicant had not complied with the CAB
insurance requirement. This last point should be particularly per-
suasive to the Sixth Circuit, since in Downs v. United States,"
which was decided after the denial of a summary judgment in
Hoffman, the Sixth Circuit emphasized that the discretionary func-
tion exception was intended to protect policy making, whatever
the rank of those so engaged."
Some of the lower courts have failed to heed the express dictate
of Dalehite, that "where there is room for policy judgment and
decision there is discretion."'" In that case the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the exception covers "all employees exercising [this]
"FAA Notice 8430.120; see 398 F. Supp. at 532.
8 Id. at 534.8 d. at 538.
89 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) (FBI agents' discretionary handling of a
hostage situation did not fall within the discretionary function exception).
90 522 F.2d at 997.
"1346 U.S. at 36.
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discretion."" If courts are permitted to penetrate the cloak of
protection afforded by the discretionary function exception, and
award money damages in satisfaction of a tort suit in cases of
alleged erroneous certification, the FAA will become the insurer
of all who manufacture aircraft under the auspices of an FAA
Type Certificate. Likewise, an Airworthiness Certificate would be
turned into an express warranty of safety to the flying public-a
result clearly not intended by Congress.
CERTIFICATION, EVEN IF UNWARRANTED, Is AT MOST A
MISREPRESENTATION As To THE AIRWORTHINESS OF AN
AIRCRAFT AND CANNOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUIT
UNDER THE FTCA
When Congress enacted a limited waiver of sovereign immunity
by means of the FTCA, it expressly excluded "any claims arising
out of . . .misrepresentation.""3 The term misrepresentation has
been construed in accordance with traditional tort concepts, and
it is well settled that this exception includes claims arising out of
negligent as well as intentional misrepresentation."
The Supreme Court spoke on the "misrepresentation exception"
in United States v. Neustadt," where the misrepresentation defense
barred a claim by a purchaser of a home who, in reliance upon a
negligent inspection and appraisal by personnel of the Federal
Housing Administration, had been, induced to pay more for prop-
erty than it was actually worth. While defending the applicability
of the misrepresentation exception against the contention that the
conduct before the bar was ordinary negligence, the Court in-
structed,
To say . that a claim arises out of 'negligence,' rather than
'misrepresentation,' when the loss suffered by the injured party is
caused by the breach of a 'specific duty' owed by the government
to him, i.e., the information upon which that party may reasonably
be expected to rely .. is only to state the traditional and com-
monly understood legal definition of the tort of 'negligent mis-
02 Id.
9328 U.S.C. 5 2680(h) (1970).
'4 Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 866 (1976).
-366 U.S. 696 (1961).
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representation' . . which there is every reason to believe Congress
had in mind when it placed the word 'misrepresentation' before
the word 'deceit.'"
Professor Prosser has noted that many forms of negligent con-
duct involve some element of misrepresentation."' Thus, in draw-
ing a distinction between negligence, for which the U.S. may be
held liable, and misrepresentation, which is exempted from suit,
the district and circuit courts have generally ruled that where the
government's misrepresentation was only incidental to an opera-
tional decision, the exception would not apply." For example, the
lower courts have held that the negligent performance of opera-
tional tasks, such as the failure of air traffic controllers to warn
pilots of hazardous conditions, did not justify the application of
the "misrepresentation exception."" Thus, a distinction can be
made between situations where there is reliance, wherein the gov-
ernment actively fails to perform a specific affirmative duty, such as
to communicate a warning, and those functions where an act, such
as certification, simply constitutes a passive representation to the
general public that there has been compliance with certain mini-
mum standards.
Cases applying the misrepresentation exception to situations
reasonably analogous to the certification process clearly support
the proposition that the United States would not be held liable
for the certification representation. In re Silver Bridge Disaster
Litigation"' cited Neustadt"' and held that even if the Bureau of
Public Roads of the United States permitted a statement to be pub-
lished, which could be considered an actionable representation of
safety as to a bridge that subsequently collapsed, and which was
a representation upon which the members of the public had a right
to rely, the plaintiff would be barred from suing the government
"Id. at 706-07.
'
7 W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 683 (4th ed. 1971).
"See, e.g., Ingham v. Eastern Airlines Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); Beech v. United States, 345 F.2d 872 (5th
Cir. 1965); 59 VA. L. REV. 73 (1973).
"United Airlines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dis-
missed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Wenninger v. United States, 234 F. Supp. 499 (D.
Del. 1964), afl'd, 352 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1965); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967).
'"381 F. Supp. 931 (S.D. W. Va. 1974).
"' 366 U.S. 696, cited, 381 F. Supp. at 977.
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by virtue of the misrepresentation exception."' An unreported ac-
tion, Bibbig v. United States,"' was brought under the FTCA
seeking damages for the crash of a motorized glider, which alleged-
ly had been ".... negligently inspected and issued an airworthiness
certificate.' '. The government raised the misrepresentation de-
fense against this allegation and a motion for dismissal was sum-
marily granted after a review of the precedent in this area. "
In Marival, Inc. v. Planes, Inc.,"' an airplane purchaser brought
an action to recover damages from the defendant seller because of
the latter's misrepresentation and breach of implied warranties
concerning the condition of the aircraft. The defendant filed a
third-party action against the United States under the FCTA, on
the theory that the FAA had negligently renewed an Airworthi-
ness Certificate for such aircraft, upon which the defendant had
relied. The defendant/third-party plaintiff's contention was that
if the aircraft was unairworthy, the government authorized in-
spector negligently performed his annual inspection, thereby ren-
dering the FAA negligent in the issuance of the craft's airworthi-
ness certificate."' The Marival Court never decided the issue of
whether an inspection performed by a person not employed by the
FAA, an Authorized Inspector,"' could result in FAA liability for
erroneous certification. 0 However, the court did comment in dic-
tum that certification by the FAA was "not designed as a com-
mercial warranty upon which a party may sue the government."' ' 0
The court granted the government's motion for dismissal, ex-
plaining that the misrepresentation exception protected the sover-
102 381 F. Supp. at 977.
"0 Civ. No. C-4606 (D. Col. May 3, 1973).
104 Id.
""Id.
"00 306 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
107 Id. at 857.
"') Authorized Inspectors are appointed under the authority of 49 U.S.C.
1425(b) (1970). Their functions are described in 14 C.F.R. §§ 65.91-65.95
(1977).
"' Regarding the likelihood of FAA liability for the negligence of independent
contractors such as "representatives," "delegates," and "designees," see Dilk,
Negligence of FAA Delegates Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 J. AIR L.
& COM. 573 (1976).
"' 306 F. Supp. at 860 n.1.
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eign from suit."' The court reasoned that even though alleged
negligent conduct in, the government's inspection may have re-
sulted in a misrepresentation of the airplane's airworthiness, the
injuries arose from the misrepresentation and not from the negli-
gent conduct."' The court further emphasized that "it was pre-
cisely this type of action, involving direct reliance on govern-
mental communication of facts, rather than direct injury from
negligent conduct, which the misrepresentation exception was de-
signed to meet.""..3
The recent decision in Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,"' has fur-
ther emphasized the weaknesses of an action for negligent certifica-
tion. The plaintiff in Lloyd was a manufacturer who brought a
third-party action against the United States, based on alleged
negligence of the FAA in inspecting and testing an aircraft prior
to the agency's issuance of a Supplemental Type Certificate and
an Airworthiness Certificate. After reviewing all the decisional
law relevant to the misrepresentation defense, the court concluded
that since the government did not cause any direct physical harm
to the aircraft, any negligent conduct by an inspector authorized
to sign on behalf of the FAA could amount to nothing more than
a misrepresentation as to the true condition of the aircraft in-
volved."' The Lloyd court expressly re-affirmed what has been
impliedly recognized since Neustadt: that the misrepresentation
exception is just as applicable to actions involving personal injury,
wrongful death, or property damage as it is to those involving
only financial and commercial loss."'
In view of the trend exemplified by Marival and Lloyd, it is
likely that if the misrepresentation exception had been raised
and dealt with by the courts in certification cases like Ciccarelli,"T
a cause of action for negligent certification would probably have
been held jurisdictionally precluded. In those areas where Congress
"I id. at 860.
112 Id.
' Id.
114 429 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
11429 F. Supp. 186-87.
"' 429 F. Supp. at 187; see also, Bartie v. United States, 216 F. Supp. 10, 18,
19 (W.D. La. 1963); Vaughn v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 286, 289 (N.D. Miss.
1966); ALI, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 311 (1965).
' Civ. No. S-1940 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 1972).
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has expressly not waived sovereign immunity, the district court is
without jurisdiction.""
The misrepresentation defense was raised in a motion for sum-
mary judgment and ignored in a recent unreported case, Cearly
v. United States."' The court considered the question of whether
the FAA had negligently issued a Supplemental Type Certificate
covering a newly installed gasoline heater. Three years after certifi-
cation, a leak apparently developed in the fuel lines leading to the
heater. A fire resulted, which caused the air crash that killed the
plaintiffs' decedents. The United States lost its motion for summary
judgment, and the government was foreclosed from arguing the
misrepresentation issue at trial. Counsel for the United States have
raised this issue again in a recent brief submitted to the Ninth
Circuit on appeal."'
Had the trial court conducted an in-depth analysis of the nature
of the negligence alleged, it would have realized that the only
connection between the passengers and the FAA was their in-
direct reliance on what arguably could be considered an implica-
tion of airworthiness resulting from the issuance of a Supplemental
Type Certificate. The alleged negligent inspection of the heater
installation and the representation that the heater system satisfied
the requirements for an airworthiness certificate, even if in fact it
did not, presents a classic example of a situation where the courts
have applied the misrepresentation exception.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs who have suffered harm from defectively designed or
manufactured aviation products, and who have attempted to make
the United States a defendant on the basis that the FAA failed
to discover the defect in the certification process, have been met by
at least three defenses at law. First, since the regulatory respon-
sibilities imposed by the Act were designed to secure the safety
of the general public instead of establishing a legal duty of care to
individuals, there can be no cause of action in tort against the
"'Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967); Fitch v. United States, 513 F.2d
1013 (6th Cir. 1975); Peterson v. United States, 428 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1970).
"I Civ. No. 70-138 (S.D. Cal. April 2, 1975), appeal docketed, No. 76-2813-17
(9th Cir. Jul. 30, 1975).
120 Id.
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United States. Second, the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA immunizes the United States from lawsuit when the agency
fails to detect a manufacturing or design defect during the certifi-
cation process, since Congress intended to exempt this type of
regulatory act from liability. Third, the decisional trend recognizes
that the issuance of a certificate implying that an aircraft is air-
worthy, which in retrospect proves to be unairworthy, is nothing
more than misrepresentation, a mistake which Congress has ex-
pressly exempted from lawsuit.
The authors also articulate the inherent distinction based upon
the separation of powers between administrative agencies and the
courts. Since Congress has given the FAA the primary jurisdiction
to regulate and to certificate aircraft, it is improper for the district
courts to arrogate to themselves the adjudicative function (which
includes technical expertise as well as discretion) of retroactively
determining whether an aircraft was. properly certificated.
Certainly, the Administrator can not guarantee the reliability
of products used in air commerce, nor does the regulatory scheme
devised by Congress require the agency to insure against risks
inherent in air travel. Aviation safety is an ideological objective.
The Administrator cannot mandate safety. Within the regulatory
concept of the certification process there may be endless oppor-
tunity for the discovery of error. Yet inherent in the FAA's regu-
latory auditing process, which contemplates a review of tests
reasonably necessary to demonstrate compliance with minimum
standards, lies the reality that not all errors and defects can be
discovered. Also, it would be physically impossible to establish
regulatory standards objective and stringent enough to prevent
the occurrence of any accident, and the cost of the absolute, or
endless redundancies, calculated to achieve the impossible goal of
perfect safety, would economically paralyze the aviation industry.
Such over-regulation would be contrary to the Administrator's re-
sponsibility to foster the development of civil aeronautics and to
undertake or supervise the developmental work and scientific test-
ing necessary to create improved aircraft. 1
Courts should also consider the economic policy implications of
imposing liability on the United States for the erroneous certifica-
1149 U.S.C. S 1353 (1970).
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tion of aircraft. Eventually, it is the taxpayer who must pay twice
if the FAA is compelled to implead and cross-claim against the
manufacturer or defend itself in a certification action. "We," the
taxpaying public, must pay initially for the regulatory services of
the FAA and "we" must pay again when the agency is forced to
step outside its regulatory role and into the courtroom. In the
procurement of navigation and radar systems from the manufac-
turing industry, the FAA occasionally becomes a plaintiff to
remedy a contractual breach. In this posture, the agency operates
as a business ensuring that the taxpayers get the benefit of their
bargain. However, when a manufacturer markets an aviation
product which is found to be defective and not in conformity
with the standards promulgated by the FAA in the Federal Avia-
tion Regulations," ' the proper function of the agency is to en-
force the regulations, not defend a tort suit. The FAA protects
the interests of the taxpaying flying public by issuing an Airworthi-
ness Directive to remedy the defect. This Directive compels con-
formity with the regulations under pain of civil fine, suspension,
or revocation of the operator's certificate."' It is the manufacturer
who is best able to reduce the risk of harm from his product, who
can utilize quality control to prevent a recurrence of the defect,
and who can discharge the common law duty of due care to those
foreseeably injured by his product.
Beyond this concept of fault and restitution, courts have also
recognized that if the manufacturer launches a defective product
into the stream of commerce which creates an unreasonable risk
of harm, the manufacturer will be held strictly liable and will be
required to bear a large part of the financial loss for injuries
caused by a defect in his product. It is believed that the manufac-
turer should bear this loss and remedy any defect to prevent a
recurrence, and, considering the financial impact of large adverse
judgments, the manufacturer should insure against such risks. The
principle of commutative justice assists the manufacturer by allow-
ing the burden to be spread among the consumers who enjoy the
benefits of air travel.
21 14 C.F.R. Parts 1 et. seq. (1977).
349 U.S.C. §5 1429a, 1471 (1970); 14 §§ C.F.R. 13.15, 13.19, 21.181
(1977).
12 See, Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-the Insigni-
ficance of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 583-87, 593-99 (1961).
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To impose liability on the United States for alleged errors in
certification distorts the commutative system of justice, which
contemplates spreading the loss once, primarily to the manu-
facturer, and then only to the flying public, not to the general
public. All taxpayers have paid once for the regulatory services
of the FAA. Individual members of the flying public will have
to pay more for air travel as a result of product liability litigation.
Yet the taxpaying general public should not have to pay a second
time when FAA is drawn into product liability litigation as a
defendant or when the FAA is required to implead, or is impleaded
by, the very manufacturer which the agency regulates, and who
is best able to bear the loss.

